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Abstract
We design a flexible algorithm that exploits deceased donor
kidneys to initiate chains of living donor kidney paired dona-
tions, combining deceased and living donor allocation mech-
anisms to improve the quantity and quality of kidney trans-
plants. The advantages of this approach have been measured
using retrospective data on the pool of donor/recipient incom-
patible and desensitized pairs at the Padua University Hospi-
tal, the largest center for living donor kidney transplants in
Italy. The experiments show a remarkable improvement on
the number of patients with incompatible donor who could
be transplanted, a decrease in the number of desensitization
procedures, and an increase in the number of UT patients (that
is, patients unlikely to be transplanted for immunological rea-
sons) in the waiting list who could receive an organ.
Introduction
Living donor kidney transplantation is the most promising
solution for closing the gap between organ demand and sup-
ply. Despite growing efforts to implement this option for pa-
tients with end-stage renal disease (ESRD), the percentage
of living donations has been decreasing in the United States
from 50.1% in 2000 to 38.2% in 2017 of the total number of
kidney transplants (OPT ). Figures are different in the Euro-
pean countries, where the expansion of living transplantation
programs is still underway: in Italy there were 310 kidney
transplants from living donor in 2017, less than one fifth of
the total number of kidney transplants.
Patients may have a willing living donor, but they can-
not receive her organ due to blood or tissue type incompat-
ibility. Some ABO-types (blood) incompatibilities between
donor and recipient can be resolved through desensitization
techniques (which are costly and may have side-effect of the
health of the patients), but in many other instances, and es-
pecially in case of patients with circulating human leuko-
cyte antigen (HLA) antibodies directed against their willing
donors, incompatibility cannot be overcome.
A welfare enhancing option for incompatible
donor/recipient pairs is to participate to kidney paired
exchange (KPE) programs that favor donors’ exchanges
among incompatible pairs. A relevant constraint in design-
ing the algorithms to maximize the number of transplants in
KPE programs, is the simultaneity of the exchanges among
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pairs. It follows that there are feasibility constraints over
the length of these cycles, because three-way cycles already
represent a logistic challenge for most of the transplant
centres.
Unfortunately, these programs are not fully and uniformly
developed among Europe, and countries such as Spain,
France, Italy, Czech Republic, Austria, Belgium, Switzer-
land, Poland and Scandinavia have just started these pro-
grams or are striving to implement one. In these countries,
few kidney paired exchanges have been performed, mainly
due to the low number of patients enrolled in such pro-
grams. In Italy, for instance, there are currently only 39
donor/recipient pairs enrolled in the National Kidney Paired
Donation program. It is quite unlikely to find two-way or
three-way cycles of exchanges among such a few pairs.
A suitable option to increase the number of transplants is
the inclusion of altruistic donors to initiate chains of kidney
paired donations (KPD). Altruistic donors enabled further
expansion of this practice, because the availability of a non-
directed living donor kidney without a designated recipient
increases the number of potential matches. Moreover, chains
starting from a deceased donor (DD) are not constrained by
simultaneous exchanges, because every patient involved in
a KPD chain will receive an organ before her donor donates
to the following patient in the chain. Therefore, in case of
a break of a chain, it never happens that a patient does not
receive an organ but her donor has already donated a kid-
ney to another patient. However, the uncertainty among both
the transplantation community and the public opinion with
regard to the intention, motivation, and legitimacy of such
donors represents a constraint to a large development of this
option in many countries.
In the present study, we consider the use of deceased
donors to initiate chains of KPD. We propose to design a
new program that combines the benefit of a KPD program
and of a deceased donors’ program, and propose algorithms
to implement it. Moreover, we analyze and quantify its po-
tential benefits by using retrospective data of the Kidney and
Pancreas Transplant Unit at Padua University Hospital, one
of the largest kidney transplant centre in Italy.
Related works
This paper contributes to the kidney exchange literature
initiated by (Delmonico 2004; Delmonico et al. 2004a;
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A. E. Roth 2004; Su, Zenios, and Chertow. 2004) and de-
veloped successively by (A. Roth 2005; Biro` et al. 2017;
Roth, Sonmez, and Unver. 2005; Unver 2010; Awasthi and
Sandholm 2009; Ashlagi and Roth 2014). These algorithms
have been further analyzed: studying the problem of trans-
plantation failures due to rejected matching (Dickerson, Pro-
caccia, and Sandholm 2013); focusing on particular classes
of patients (e.g. patients with a very low probability of trans-
plantation) (Dickerson, Procaccia, and Sandholm 2014); an-
alyzing the computational complexity of the problem as ILP
(Abraham, Blum, and Sandholm 2007); providing an analy-
sis of the efficacy of altruistic-donor chains (Dickerson, Pro-
caccia, and Sandholm 2012); studying the problem of hav-
ing long chains of kidney exchanges (Glorie, van de Klun-
dert, and Wagelmans 2014; Anderson et al. 2015); provid-
ing incentives to compatible pairs to participate in these
programs (Nicolo` and Rodrı´guez-A´lvarez 2012; Nicolo` and
Rodrı´guez-A´lvarez 2017; Gentry et al. 2007); using altruis-
tic donors to initiate chains of donation (Sonmez and Un-
ver 2014; Rees et al. 2009; Manlove and O’malley 2014;
Manlove and O’Malley 2015).
The ethical implications of the utilization of deceased-
donors grafts to start chains of donations has been ana-
lyzed previously (Melcher et al. 2016). In (Wall, Veale, and
Melcher 2017) an approach for using deceased-donors to
start donation chains is proposed, giving priority in the wait-
ing list to patients that have a donor (a chain starts only if one
of these particular patients is selected from the deceased-
donor waiting list). A similar approach that modify the prior-
ity of patients in the waiting list (with the emission of vouch-
ers) is developed in (Veale et al. 2017). Another similar work
(Roth et al. 2006) adopts list exchange procedures accord-
ing to which a living incompatible donor provides a kidney
to a candidate on the deceased-donor wait-list and in return
his intended recipient receives a ‘priority on the deceased-
donor wait-list. We differentiate from these works mainly in
two ways: we do not modify the waiting list (that is handled
with a separate standard algorithm); we give priority to the
UT patients (patients with unlikely transplantability). Also
in (Delmonico et al. 2004b) the authors consider deceased-
donors to start chains of donation: this approach can be bet-
ter described as a “List Exchange procedure”. Contrary to
our work, a pair donates before his recipient receives an or-
gan from, and there is a degree of uncertainty of the prioriti-
zation in the waiting list (mostly in case of highly sensitized
patients).
The Algorithm
Given a compatibility graph that includes all patients,
donors, and organs (to be precisely described later), our al-
gorithm looks for cycles or chains in this graph, and it is
triggered by either the arrival of a new patient/donor pair (in
this case we look for a cycle, via the cycle detection proce-
dure), or of a new deceased-donor kidney (in this case we
look for a chain, via the chain detection procedure, and we
release the donor of the last chain element to the deceased
donor waiting list). Both procedures solve an optimization
problem on a graph structure, and aim at maximizing the
number of transplants.
An overview of the algorithm is depicted in Figure 1.
A chain is foundA cycle is found
New pair joins 
the pool
Cycle detection Chain detection
DD kidney
arrives
Deceased 
donor 
waiting list
P
P P
K
P
UT
K
P
P
or
Figure 1: The algorithm.
Patient pool
We now give the details of our scenario, where we consider
the following types of patients:
• UT patients: these are patients with unlikely trans-
plantability, that is, patients that are difficult to match
with donors since they are highly immunized. Usually this
type of patients are at their second or third transplant.
• NT pairs donor/patient: these are pairs that are not com-
patible between each other and therefore cannot be trans-
planted between themselves.
• DS pairs donor/patient: these are pairs that are not com-
patible between each other but they can be transplanted
between themselves with desensitization. Desensitization
is a procedure that solve light incompatibility (like the
blood type or the RH type) but it induces stress in the
body of the patient, who is already week from the dialy-
sis. It also has a high cost from a financial point of view,
so both for the patient and the hospital would be better to
be avoided.
We define our pool of patients as a set that can include
UT patient, NT pairs, DS pairs, or optimal kidneys from de-
ceased donors1. The composition of the pool varies with the
time: given each time stamp t we denote the pool at that par-
ticular moment as P (t). P (t) contains all the UT patients,
NT pairs, DS pairs that are in the deceased donor waiting list
at that particular time t, and the kidneys arrived in the pool
at time t. We are not interested in all the time stamps t but
1In the Experiments section we will describe further restrictions
on the pool composition, differently for each experimental setting.
only those at which the pool composition change. These par-
ticular moments happen when a new pair join the deceased-
donor waiting list or when a new deceased-donor kidney ar-
rives.
The compatibility graph
We represent each element of the pool (each pair NT, pair
DS, patient UT, or kidney) as a node of a compatibility
graph, which is a directed, possibly cyclic, graph. In the
graph there are three different types of nodes: nodes repre-
senting to donor/patient pairs (either UT pairs or DS pairs);
kidney nodes that correspond to a deceased donor kidney;
and UT patient nodes that correspond to recipients of un-
likely transplantability. Edges in the graph instead repre-
sent the compatibility between two nodes: we add an edge
(X,Y ) from node X to node Y only if the donor/kidney of
nodeX is compatible with the patient of node Y . Nodes rep-
resenting kidneys only have outgoing edges and UT patients
nodes have only incoming edges. Pair nodes may have both
outgoing and incoming edges. Therefore we partition the set
of nodes N in three sets: P the set of the pair nodes, UT
the set of immunized patient and K the set of kidney. Given
a node X , we call EX the set of its edges, partitioned in
two subsets: the incoming edges E−X and the outgoing edges
E+X .
An edge can be active or inactive: to each edge e is asso-
ciated a value ve in {0, 1} such that ve = 1 if the edge is
active and 0 if inactive. The semantics of the active/inactive
edges is that the edges represents possible transplants, and
the active ones represent the transplants that are performed
in practice at that time stamp t.
Constraints
A set of constraints is defined on activation values of the in-
coming and outgoing edges of a node depending on its types.
Kidney nodes (K): This type of node can either have only
an outgoing edge activated, or all the edges inactive, because
each kidney can be given only to one patient or to no one.
Pair nodes (P):. This type of node can either have only an
incoming edge activated, or one incoming and one outgo-
ing edge activated or all the edges inactive. This because a
pair cannot donate a kidney without receiving another kid-
ney, but can receive and not donate because in this case the
kidney of the donor will be donated to the patients in the
deceased-donor waiting list.
Immunized patient nodes (UT): This type of node can
have either only an incoming edge active, or all the edges
inactive. This because each patient can either receive only
one kidney or no kidney.
We can translate the constraints described above more for-
mally as:
ve ∈ {0, 1} ∀e ∈ E activation∑
e∈EX ve ∈ {0, 1} ∀X ∈ K K nodes∑
e∈E−X ve −
∑
e∈E+X ve ∈ {0, 1} ∀X ∈ P P nodes∑
e∈EX ve ∈ {0, 1, 2} ∀X ∈ P P nodes∑
e∈EX ve ∈ {0, 1} ∀X ∈ UT UT nodes
In our experiments we considered also an additional con-
straint over the compatibility graph: if we include in our pool
also kidneys that we would allocate to an immunized patient
(UT) in the deceased donor waiting list, then we want to pre-
serve the number of UT patients that receive an organ. This
because we want to prioritize this category and not create a
disadvantage. The formulation of this constraint is:∑
X∈UT
(
∑
e∈E−X
ve)−
∑
X∈K
(
∑
e∈E−X
ve) ≥ 0
Objective function
At each iteration of the algorithm (either cycle or chain
detection), we maximize the following objective function:∑
e∈E ve, that maximize the number of active edges in the
graph. This corresponds to maximizing the number of trans-
plants. It is important to notice that a priority over the UT
patients respect to normal patients in the waiting list is im-
plicitly encoded in the graph construction. Once obtained a
solution (a set of active edges), the patients/pairs that will
be transplanted correspond to the subset of nodes that are
touched by active edges. We then remove this nodes/patients
for the next iteration of the procedure.
Main procedures
We describe now, formally, the two different procedures:
Cycle detection: This happen when at time t a new pair
joins the pool. We build a compatibility graph using only
the pair nodes currently part of the pool P (t). On the com-
patibility graph, we then maximize the length of a cycle in-
volving the new pair, if exist. To this purpose we create an-
other graph, namely the cycle graph, in which each node
corresponds to a cycle of length 2 or 3 (this is a common
assumption in this scenarios, since all the transplants in the
cycle have to be performed simultaneously). The edges of
the cycle graph connect two nodes representing cycles with
at least one node in common in the compatibility graph. We
solve this optimization problem maximizing the cardinality
of a coloring problem over the cycles graph.
Chain detection: This happen when at time t a new
deceased-donor kidney arrives to the waiting list. We build a
compatibility graph using the pair nodes, the UT nodes cur-
rently part of the pool P (t) and and the kidney node. Here
we look for the maximum chain of nodes starting from the
kidney. We solve this problem as a single source longest path
problem2.
Assumptions
The implementation of the algorithm that we used for our
experiments is based on two assumptions/restrictions. The
first assumption is that, during the chain detection phase,
the compatibility graph is assumed to be acyclic since all
the transplant in the cycles are performed in previous steps.
This is a reasonable assumption for our study, but in real-
ity many cycles are not performed since patients involved
2Note that we assume the pool P (t) to be acyclic, since all the
transplant in the cycles are performed in previous steps
prefer to wait to obtain a better graft. Thus the compatibil-
ity graph could contain some cycles. The second restriction
is that during the cycle detection our algorithm focus only
on cycles that involve the new pair. This is a reasonable as-
sumption for our study since we are operating in a small
pool (described in the Experiments Section). In practice if
we consider a bigger pool (for example at national level),
the introduction of new pairs is done monthly. This implies
that at that time t usually more than one pair is introduced
to the pool. In this case we are not interested on maximizing
the length of a single cycle but on maximizing the total num-
ber of transplants. That means we are looking for the set of
cycles that maximally cover the graph without intersections.
We also implemented a different version of the algorithm
for a general use, that supports also the removal of the two
restriction described above. The new version of the algo-
rithm is a reformulation of the maximization problem in in-
teger linear programming (ILP). The objective function to
maximize is the sum of active edges and the constrains cor-
respond to a ILP version of the constraints on the compat-
ibility graph described at the beginning of the section. We
implemented the algorithm in Python using the open-source
library lp solve.
Examples
We now show two examples, one for the cycle detection step
of the procedure in Example 1 and one for the kidneys pro-
cessing step in Figure 2.
Example 1 (Cycle detection). In the cycle detection exam-
ple (Figure 2) we have four pairs P.0, P.1, P.2 and P.3. The
patient in P.0 is compatible with the donor in P.1; the pa-
tient in is P.1 compatible with the donors in P.0 and P.2;
the patient in is P.2 compatible with the donors in P.0 and
P.1; and the patient in is P.3 compatible with the donor in
P.2. We can see that the algorithm detects the cycle with the
maximal number of transplants (the edges in red): between
nodes P.0, P.1 and P.2.
P.0
P.1P.3
P.2
Figure 2: Example 1: cycle detection.
Example 2 (Chain detection). In the kidneys processing ex-
ample in Figure 3, we have four nodes: tree pairs P.0, P.1
and P.2; one kidney from a deceased donorK; and one UT
patients UT . The patient in P.0 is compatible only kidney
from a deceased donor K; the patient in is P.1 is compati-
ble with the donor in P.0 and kidney from a deceased donor
K; the patient in is P.2 is compatible with the donor in P.1
; and the patient in UT is compatible with the donors in P.0
and P.1. We can see that the algorithm detects the longest
chain that maximize the number of transplants that starts
fromK then reach in order P.0, P.1 and ends in UT .
UT
P.0 P.1
P.2
K
Figure 3: Example 2: chain detection.
Experiments
While the cycles detection procedure is well studied in the
literature from an ethical point of view, the chain detection
starting from a deceased donor is a novel method. Our se-
quential algorithm for chain detection works as follows on
our pool: when an organ from a deceased donor becomes
available, we compute all the chains that could be generated
by assigning this organ to some recipient with an incompat-
ible living donor. Among all chains, we perform the longest
one and we remove all recipients and corresponding donors
from the pool. When the following organ becomes available
we iterate the procedure with the remaining pool. The recip-
ient of the deceased donor organ could be any of the patients
with an incompatible donor who were not transplanted dur-
ing the period. Receiving a transplant, even from a deceased
donor, is a sure gain for those patients who were not trans-
planted, but one may argue that this policy would subtract
organs from the pool available for waitlisted candidates. The
organ harvested from a living donor of the last component of
the chain will terminate to a deceased donor waitlisted pa-
tient; therefore waitlisted patients without a potential living
donor do not suffer due to the introduction of this allocation
procedure - because the expected graft survival of a living
donor kidney is on average higher than a deceased donor
one. Nevertheless, there has to be some equity warranted for
the waitlisted candidates with a lower probability of find-
ing a compatible organ. To this end, we add two constraints
to our algorithm. First, deceased donor organs that were
directly allocated to recipients of unlikely transplantability
recipients were excluded from the algorithm, and we only
consider organs allocated to patients in the standard waiting
list. Second, anytime there exists more than one living donor
chain with the maximal length, we select the one, if any, that
ends with an UT recipient.
All the experiments were conducted using a custom
Python code on a machine with an Eight-Core Intel(R)
Xeon(R) 2.40GHz with 256GB of RAM.
Data
From January 2012 to December 2014 at the Kidney and
Pancreas Transplantation Unit of the Padua University-
Hospital 358 single kidney transplants (KT) were per-
formed. Among them, 251 KT were done with grafts from
deceased donors and 107 from living donors. The living
donors transplantation included: 77 AB0-compatible pairs
Characteristics Kidneys UT patients NT donors NT patients DS donors DS patients
SEX F/M 30/39 14/21 11/7 8/8 22/8 13/17
AGE (mean) 48 47 54.34 47.12 48.63 42.07
BLOOD type A/B/AB/0 30/11/4/24 13/2/1/19 7/4/0/7 4/3/0/9 15/2/6/7 8/5/1/16
PRA max (mean) - 58.43 - 56.56 - -
Table 1: Pool characteristics
and 30 desensitized recipients (22 AB0 incompatible pairs
and 8 recipients with donor-specific anti-HLA antibodies).
During the same span, 16 incompatible pairs were evaluated
in the centre and were enrolled in the KPE program and/or
listed for deceased donor kidney transplantation and could
not be transplanted within the three-year period (in 2 cases a
recipient had 2 willing donors). Among the DD kidneys that
were allocated to this centre in the relevant span, we only
consider organs of from deceased donors of ”high quality”,
that is with an expected graft survival comparable to that of
a living donor, according to the medical literature (age < 60
years, absence of comorbidities such as hypertension and di-
abetes, calculated creatinine clearance> 60 ml/min, absence
of proteinuria). We also excluded organs that were assigned
to UT patients . UT recipients were defined based on the
classification of The Nord Italia Transplant Program (NITp),
which considers UT recipients those patients on the waiting-
list for more than 5 years or on dialysis for more than 7 years.
During the period of study, (2012-2014), 35 UT recipients
of unlikely transplantability were listed at our Centre and
did not receive any organ. Summing up, data used to run our
retrospective studies are the following: 16 NT pairs, 30 DS
pairs, 35 UT recipients, 69 DD ”high-quality” kidneys.
The population of DS pairs benefit from the participation
to the program because recipients of these pairs could avoid
debilitating and costly desensitization procedures. However,
these patients should be considered differently than patients
who were not transplanted to ensure that they are willing
to enter into the program. To this end, we impose two con-
straints to the algorithm. First, for desensitised patients (DS
patients), the advantage of receiving a kidney from a com-
patible donor in a KPE fashion should not prolong their wait-
ing time on dialysis: therefore, we grant the availability of
these pairs in the pool within 6 months from the date of their
actual transplant; after this date recipients are desensitized
and get the organ of their willing donor. Second, DS patients
can only receive an organ from a living donor and not from
a deceased donor, and therefore they cannot be the first re-
cipient of a living donor chain initiated by a deceased donor
organ.
For a proper allocation of the organs, immunological vari-
ables of donors and recipients were taken into account (e.g.
HLA typing, blood type, etc.). The statistics on the distri-
bution 3 of sex, age, blood type and PRA max of the above
described pool are summarized in Table 1.
3The number of donors of the NT pairs could be greater than
the number of patients because some patients have multiple donors.
This does not happen for the DS pairs since these pairs have already
been transplanted with their donor that is therefore unique.
Experiments’ Design
We performed a set of experiment varying a set of 4 param-
eters. Each experiment is labeled with four letters filling a
slot of four fields, each one corresponding to the presence of
the corresponding parameter. If a parameter is missing we
denote it with the hyphen symbol: −. We describe now the
four ordered fields:
First field (C): In these experiments we perform cycles de-
tection when a new pair enter the pool. We consider the se-
quence of entering of pairs to the waiting list. Any time a
new pair join the program we ran the algorithm searching
the longest cycle involving the new pair. In the experiments
without the ’C’ as first field we do not look for cycles but
only for chains of donations.
Second field (C): In these experiments we perform chain
detection when a new deceased-donor kidney arrive to the
waiting list. We consider the sequence of deceased donor
organs that were available in the relevant time span to initi-
ate living donor chains and any time a new organ was avail-
able we ran the algorithm searching the longest living donor
chain initiated by this organ. In the experiments without the
’C’ as second field we do not search for chains but only cy-
cles of donations.
Third field (D): We add to the pool the pairs of DS patients
(NT pairs are always in the pool). The algorithm works in a
similar fashion to the previous one, but in addition, when an
incompatible pair requiring desensitization joins the pool,
we immediately check if it is possible to create a two or
three-way exchange among the pairs who are in our pool
at that moment. The population of DS pairs benefit from
the participation to the program because recipients of these
pairs could avoid debilitating and costly desensitization pro-
cedures. However, these patients should be considered dif-
ferently than patients who were not transplanted to ensure
that they are willing to enter into the program. To this end,
we impose two constraints to the algorithm. First, a DS pa-
tient and her donor remain in the pool for at most six months.
During this span, they are scrutinized in each algorithm it-
eration: that is when either a new deceased donor organ be-
comes available, or a new incompatible pair requiring de-
sensitization joins the pool. After six months, if no exchange
was possible, they will leave the pool, and the transplant is
performed using desensitization between the pair. Second,
a DS patient can only receive an organ from a living donor
and not from a deceased donor, and therefore cannot be the
first recipient of a living donor chain initiated by a deceased
donor organ. In the experiments without the ’D’ as third field
we do not introduce in the pool of desensitized pairs, but
only NT pairs.
Number of: -C- - -C-0 -CD- -CD0 C-D- CCD- CCD0 CCD0+
NT patients who received an organ 8/16 8/16 12/16 9/16 4/16 12/16 10 /16 7/16
DS patients who avoided desensitization 0/16 0/16 10/16 4/16 6/16 10/16 10/16 6/16
UT patients who received an organ 11/35 6/35 9/35 7/35 0/35 9/35 5/35 3/35
Deceased donor kidneys that are used 15/69 7/69 14/69 8/69 0/69 14/69 5/69 3/69
Living donor kidneys returned to the waiting list 4 1 5 1 0 5 0 0
Table 2: Results of the performed experiments.
Fourth field (0): Since the kidneys with 0 blood type are
more favorites (since compatible with all the other blood
types) we want to preserve the number of 0-type organs
given to the deceased-donor waiting list. To do this, when
we receive a 0-type kidney we only allow the chain either to
finish with a UT-patient or returning a 0-type kidney to the
deceased-donor waiting list. In the experiments without the
‘0’ as last field the chains can end with any patient or pair,
without any restriction on their blood type.
We provide now some example of experiments labels as-
sociated with their meaning.
Example 3. For example the experiment -C- - represents the
dynamic computation of only chains on a pool composed by:
NT pairs, a deceased-donor kidney and UT patients. The ex-
periment CCD0 instead represent the dynamic computation
of chains and cycles on a pool composed by: NT pairs, DS
pairs, a deceased-donor kidney and UT patients with the 0-
type preservation constraint.
It is important to notice that not all the combinations of
these four parameters is feasible. For example all the combi-
nations with the first two fields both empty it is not possible,
since we want to perform at least one procedure between
chain detection or cycle detection.
Moreover, in our experiments we considered also a
stronger version of the 0-type preservation constraint, that
will be denoted as 0+: as in the 0-type preservation con-
straint with the addition that if the deceased-donor kidney
has 0 blood type then we allow the chain either to finish
with a UT-patient with 0 blood type or returning a 0 blood
type kidney to the deceased-donor waiting list.
Results and Discussion
The results of the retrospective simulations are summarized
in Table 2.
Analyzing for example the experiment−C−0, we notice
that given a cohort of 16 incompatible pairs, and a pool of 69
standard deceased-donors allocated to the Padua Transplant
Centre, it turns out that by using 7 grafts from DDs to start a
chain, it was theoretically possible to transplant 50% of the
patients who would have not been otherwise able to receive
a transplant in a time span of three years. This means that
only 10% of the entire pool of standard grafts available was
utilized to enter the program. Moreover, in most of the cases
(6 out of 7) the chains ended to a UT recipient who therefore
received a living donor kidney instead of a deceased-donor
organ.
However, it is noteworthy that, differently from in list ex-
changes, patients participating in a chain of donations re-
ceive a kidney before her/his donor donates an organ to an-
other patient. Moreover, for each incompatible pair, who can
start a chain of donations, it is possible to compute in ad-
vance (in offline fashion) which is the optimal chain to per-
form, making the logistics easier.
The usefulness of the proposed program results undeni-
able, since it increases the overall number of kidneys avail-
able for transplantation and, consequently, the aggregate
quality and quantity of life of end-stage-renal-disease pa-
tients. Our procedure has been approved and a first trial at
the local level of a KP chain initiated by a DD has been per-
formed on March 14, 2018 and two more chains respectively
of three and four length are currently performed at national
level showing the benefits of the program also in practice.
Conclusion and Future work
In this paper we have analyzed the efficiency of a novel allo-
cation procedure for kidney transplant: we have proposed a
first method based on the idea of considering both cycles of
exchanges and chains of exchanges which start from a de-
ceased donor kidney. We have implemented the procedure
and have tested it in a retrospective fashion, using historical
data from Padua’s transplantation center. The results show
that we increase both the number of incompatible pairs that
are transplanted and the number of highly-sensitized (UT)
patients that received a donation (that normally have a very
low probability to receive a compatible kidney). Moreover
we have avoided desensitization by the majority of the pa-
tient/donor pairs that were transplanted with desensitization.
An immediate next step for our work would be the exten-
sion the program to more than one single centre. This would
likely lead to better results, since the pool would be bigger
increasing the probability of compatibility.
A possible further expansion of this program that com-
bines living and deceased donors is represented by the in-
clusion of compatible pairs to the pool of participants, en-
couraging them to enroll in the program with the promise of
a gain in terms of expected quality of the organ with respect
to the intended donor.
We plan also to consider the patients’ preferences in order
to minimize the number of matching rejections. For instance
we could include the patients’ preferences about the location
of the hospital (to avoid rejections for logistical problems)
or estimate the risk aversion of each patient and the corre-
sponding donor (to minimize the possibility of withdraws
due to the non-simultaneously of the transplants).
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